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BACKGROUND
DERMOT SCOTT*
The goal of European Union -- either as the culmination’of
a process of integration, or as a stage in that process -- underlies
much of post-war western European history. It strongly
influenced the establishment of a Community of, now, twelve
Member States, bound by the Treaties of Paris and Rome, and
by subsequent adjustments to those Treaties. The Member States
are bound also by additional policies not foreseen in the Treaties,
such as the European Monetary System, and by non-Treaty
agreements running parallel to the Treaties, such as European
Political Co-operation. Further instruments or policies operate
in other spheres and bring together some or all Member States,
with or without the co-operation of non-Community countries:
Ariane and the European Space Agency, Airbus, the proposed
EUREKA programme of high technology research, the COST
programme (European co-operation in science and technology)
and so forth. There is however a widespread feeling that the
Community is not realising its full potential economically or
politically, and that its organisational structure and rules are
insufficient for the task.
The first elected European Parliament agreed in 1984 by an
overwhelming vote that a new Treaty was required. The Draft
Treaty which Parliament adopted aimed to update and con-
solidate the existing legal instruments, provide for further
Community policies and impose rules and procedures which
would make the institutions more efficient and more decisive.
By increasing the powers of the European Parliament, part-
icularly in the legislative process, it also aimed to guarantee the
*The author is an official of the European Parliament secretariat, but the views expressed
here are personal and do not commit the Parliament.
democratic nature of the Community and keep its decisions
responsive to the will of the European electorate.
A simultaneous concern of the Parliament was the evident
disparity between the effect of the oil crisis on Europe and its
effect on the USA and Japan: In Europe production stagnated,
unemployment grew and inflation persisted, while the USA and
Japan experienced economic growth, new job creation and lower
inflation. A report commissioned by Parliament (Albert and Ball,
1983) attributed Europe’s poor comparative performance to its
failure to adjust its living standards and to its failure to act as
a coherent economic unit. On the one hand, public sector workers
had successfully defended their living standards, while
governments had protected those of social welfare recipients, with
the burden being financed either by borrowing, often external,
or by further taxation. On the other hand, the persistence of
non-tariff barriers, the national ambit of public procurement,1
particularly in the high-technology and related defence sectors,
the failure to co-ordinate economic and monetary policies, the
duplication of national research programmes, and the consequent
failure to reap the economic benefits of a Single Community
market of 320 million consumers -- all these were symptoms
of disunion.
Such findings ran counter to the assumptions prevalent up
to the mid-1970s, when the Community was praised for its
success in reaping the benefits of negative integration -- i.e.,
dismantling national protection through the implementation of
the customs union, the adoption of the common’ external tariff
and the fixing of low tariffs vis-&vis third countries -- and
criticised for its failureto move on to more positive aspects of
integration -- a common currency, more developed structural
policies, and eventual economic and monetary union. The
change may have been due to a realisation that the progress of
the 1960s had been less effective than was thought at the time,
or that shortcomings in the development of the internal market
1. Albert and Ball "(op tit, p.75) estimate at 40 billion ECU the annual loss to the
Community from failure to operate a unified procurement market. They_quote a
Commission estimate of 12 billion ECU for the annual cost to the Community from
the imposition of administrative delays at internal frontiers. Total losses are therefore
of the order of 50 billion ECU, or 2 per cent of combined Community GDP, or twice
the Community budget.
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had been disguised by the underlying economic growth. Another
possible explanation is that national authorities had learnt during
the 1970s how to circumvent the rules, and that the protectionist
impulse induced by the 1973 oil price rise, and the consequent
fall in economic activity, had given them the incentive to exploit
every possible means of exporting their unemployment.
Whatever the reasons for the change in emphasis, a new set
of assumptions concentrated on a two-fold strategy for economic
recovery -- the creation of a really free and unified internal
market, and increased co-operation in new fields. The creation
of the free internal market required the abolition of customs
formalities within the Community, eventual harmonisation of
VAT and corporation taxes, the creation of Community
standards, and meanwhile, the immediate mutual recognition
of national standards; it also implied action on public
procurement, on the market in services, including insurance,and
on monetary co-operation. The new fields of co-operation which
were most frequently mentioned were the areas of high
technology, such as aircraft, space research, electronics and
information technology, as well as biotechnology and energy.
These preoccupations were shared by all the Community’s
institutions. The European Council was calling for measures to
reinforce the internal market at Copenhagen in December 1982,
for a study of how to abolish all police and customs formalities
at internal frontiers (Fontainebleau, June 1984), for European
standards (Dublin, December 1984), and for action to achieve
a single large market by 1992 (Brussels, March 1985). The
European Commission repeatedly echoed this theme, most
recently in the 1985 Programme of the incoming Delors
Commission, and in the comprehensive White Paper of June
1985, Completing the Internal Market. There was of course a
recognition that other factors made important contributions to
Europe’s poor economic performance, whether labour market
rigidities, United States policy, or the failure to stage a joint
reflationary effort throughout the Community. There was,
however, among partisans of different views, a common
recognition of the need to improve the effectiveness and scope
of the Community.
The impetus for economic recovery and the parallel movement
towards political integration produced a powerful combined
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thrust, with three interconnected requirements:
Freeing the market requires the demolition of barriers, and
poses immense political problems for the governments of
the Community, since each barrier presumably protects
some entrenched interest group. Removing barriers quickly
will require tough, speedy decision making in the Council
of Ministers.
Speedy decision making requires at least the limitation of
the use, or, more probably, the removal of the veto. Only
if the veto is removed can a government honestly tell its
interest groups that it has tried to protect them, but been
outvoted. Only thus can governments survive the trauma
necessary to bring about the free market.
However, it is not sufficient for a government to be able
to say it has been outvoted, it must also be able to point
to the advantages of the more integrated Community. The
medium-term advantages which should flow from a unified
market are part of the answer; so, some participants argued,
is a commitment by the Community to greater structural
action to promote convergence, in other words, to help
bring about a general levelling up Of the economies of all
regions, and to compensation of losers in the transitional
period; so also is a general commitment to greater European
solidarity.
In this way, proposals for economic, political and institutional
reform have gathered pace since the European Council’s Solemn
Declaration on European Union (1983). The European
Parliament’s Draft Treaty on European Union was adopted in
February 1984. President Mitterrand expressed his support for
it in May 1984 and was in turn supported by Chancellor Kohl,
while the majority 0f national parliaments in the Twelve
expressed totally or generally favourable reactions. The
Fontainebleau summit established the Dooge Committee which
reported in March 1985 on lines generally similar to those in
the Draft Treaty; and in June 1985, the Milan Summit decided,
by a majority vote of seven to three, to establish an inter-
governmental conference to consider changes to the Treaties.
Reaction in Ireland to this process has been somewhat
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guarded. Conferences at the Royal Irish Academy,2 and at
Blarney dealt mainly with political and institutional issues. The
Joint Oireachtas Committee’s report on the Draft Treaty also
concentrated on the veto and on neutrality, but saw abandonment
of the veto as a possibility in return for an adequate level of
Community solidarity. It also referred to the "considerable
economic, social, cultural and political advantages to be gained
from a properly functioning European Union", though it
expressed some caveats -- that the European Union should have
sufficient resources, and that these resources should be
redistributed to aid economic convergence. Senator Dooge
himself was prepared to go along with the entire content of his
report, unlike some of his colleagues, except on the issue of
defence, where he abstained, and the veto, where he inserted
a clarification.
It is appropriate that The Economic and Social Research
Institute should organise a symposium to discuss economic issues
raised for Ireland by the proposals for European Union. Four
papers were given, of which three are published here in a revised
and updated form, those on the macroeconomic consequences
of completing the market by John Bradley, on the economic
implications of tax harmonisation by John FitzGerald, and on
subsidiarity, regional development and nation-building by Miceal
Ross. An introductory paper, "Economic Union: the Economic
Implications for Ireland," was given by Alan Matthews, whose
views have already been published in a slightly different version.
Matthews argues that there is a distinction to be drawn between
the possible economic benefits to Ireland of a general move
towards European union, and the possible costs to Ireland of
participation in that union. European union could indeed bring
economic benefits, but Irish participation in it would bring
industrial and economic costs. Decision-makers might therefore
consider weighing the political possibilities of opting for a free
ride. However, any decision not to join an evolving European
2. Royal Irish Academy, National Committee for the Study of International Affairs,
7th annual conference, 23 November 1984 (paper by Eamonn Gallagher); Royal Irish
Academy, National Committee etc, and the Irish Association for European Studies,
Conference on "European Union: The Community at the Crossroads", 12 April 1985.
All the above papers are published in Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol 2, No 1,
1985, Royal Irish Academy, Dublin.
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Union must be balanced against the risk of thereby putting in
jeopardy the benefits of membership of the existing Community.
If a free ride should not be possible, a judgement must be made
on whether the benefits of the union, including its redistributive
policies, would be sufficient to offset any negative effects of
membership, or whether it would be possible for Ireland to opt
out of particular aspects of the union which it felt would be
damaging. Matthews remarks that Ireland might be better to
aim at a federal model of integration, rather than at a union
model, as the federal model supposes a greater element of
transfers from centre to periphery.
The symposium took place on 30 May 1985, one month before
the Milan Summit. At that st’age it appeared probable that a
decision would be taken at the Summit to limit the use of the
veto in the Council of Ministers, impelled both by the
enlargement to twelve members and the consequently increasing
difficulty of reaching a consensus, and by the wish to improve
decision-making in general. A decision was also expected on
adopting a programme of measures to bring about the free
internal market, perhaps involving common standards, a freeing
of the provision of services and the eventual elimination of border
controls. Some at least of the heads of government realised that
the creation of a free internal market would bring not only
benefits, but also a social and political need for transitional
measures to compensate losers, and that such measures would
require additional funds, as would measures to increase co-
operation in European research and production. In the event,
the Milan Summit decided to move forward both on the
EUREKA programme, and, through the intergovernmental
conference, on necessary changes to the Treaties. At the time
of writing no formal conclusions can be drawn on the outcomes,
though a Conference on the establishment of the EUREKA
programme was held in Hanover in Autumn 1985, and the
Luxembourg Summit of 2-3 December produced a draft package
of changes to the Treaties. The package consisted mainly of
measures concerned with the internal market, monetary affairs,
cohesion, research, the environment, social policyand the powers
of Parliament and Commission, as well as a draft treaty on
political co-operation. These measures were regarded by
Parliament and by some Member States as an inadequate
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response to the needs outlined above, and by the Danish
Parliament as going too far, but have now been agreed.
The papers published here, together with the Matthews paper,
address some of the economic questions on which discussion of
further European integration should be based. Will European
prosperity bring Irish prosperity? Does a free market threaten
traditional Irish industry, or aid new Irish industry, or both?
How can a small peripheral economy survive and prosper in a
monetary union? How much autonomy does an Irish
government at present enjoy in monetary and fiscal policy? Are
Ireland’s interests close to the Community average? Questions
such as these are asked by politicians, who expect economists
to answer them; economists tend to react by asking further
questions, by demanding quantitative data on which to base their
assessments. It is one of the positive points of these papers that
the economists have been willing to be drawn out on some of
these current issues of political economy, even if others remain
to be tackled. I believe that the burden of these papers does not
suggest any reason for doubting that in the long term it is in
Ireland’s interest that the Community should be economically
and politically strong, and that Ireland should be a full partner
in that Community.
European Parliament Information Office
Dublin
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COMPLETING THE MARKET:
MACROECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES
JOHN BRADLEY
Human nature does not change. But if men establish
rules and institutions that govern relationships between
them, and insist that these rules be obeyed, then that
fundamentally alters relations between them. This
process is the very act of civilisation.
Jean Monnet
1. Introduction
We have become used to hearing pessimistic statements of the
serious nature of the problems facing the Irish economy. Hence,
it is with a sense of familiarity that we read the introductory
paragraphs of the Report to the European Council by the ad hoc
Committee for Institutional Affairs (the Dooge Report
henceforth). In them it is claimed that the EEC has failed to
realise fully the bright future which was anticipated for it, and
that the Member States are in basic disagreement over many
economic and political issues. Most seriously, that after ten years
of crisis, Europe unlike Japan and the United States, has not
achieved a growth rate sufficient to reduce the disturbing figure
of over 14 million unemployed.1
An Irish perspective on the problems of the EEC was given
last year by Professor Kennedy in his Busteed Memorial Lecture
(Kennedy, 1985). He commented that it would be reasonable
to expect increasing economic interdependence to be
accompanied by a strengthening of the international institutions
which are designed to co-ordinate national policies which have
international spill-over effects. Such institutions, however, remain
1. The Albert and Ball Report to the European Parliament presents a comprehensive
analysis of the USA-Japan-Europe comparison (Albert and Ball, 1983). Basevi et alia,
(1983) present a more theoretical analysis.
weak and largely ineffective and countries continue to ignore
the international consequences of many of their policy actions.
Indeed, the role of the EEC may accentuate the problem since
its institutions may facilitate restrictive policies more easily than
expansionary policies. The conclusion is that the consequences
of a prolonged failure to develop greater international co-
operation would be very serious.
The topic of European union, in its many possible forms, is
immense and daunting. The Dooge Report and the recent White
Paper from the Commission to the European Council are merely
the latest in a long line of reports dealing with the evolution of
European institutions and policies.~ Since the members of the
Dooge Committee were the direct representatives of the EEC
heads of government, we are entitled to believe that their
deliberations carry weight and have a high probability of eventual
implementation in one form or another. Hence, I shall focus
fairly narrowly on the issues raised in the Dooge Report, bearing
in mind, of course, its historical background. I further restrict
myself to its economic aspects (i.e., mainly Section IIA of the
Dooge Report) which set as a priority objective the creation
of a homogenous internal economic area. I am in no way
antipathetic to the promotion of the common values of civilisation
(Section IIB) or to the search for an external identity (Section
IIC). I am simply not convinced that co-ordination in matters
of culture and defence is a necessary pre-requisite to co-ordiantion
of economic policies. The Commission’s White Paper, in
addition, lays down a fairly precise timetable for the
implementation of economic measures in formal documents and
laws.
In Section 2 I summarise some of the key economic aspects
of the Dooge Report. In Section 3 1 examine briefly the important
concepts of economic convergence, policy co-ordination and
harmonisation, commenting on the obstacles to co-ordination
and on the relative paucity of empirical work available which
throws light on the international transmission of economic forces.
Dooge claims the EMS to be one of the "achievements of the
Community during the last decade". The EMS and its precur-
2. Swarm, (1984) is a useful and accessible account of progress within the EEG since
its foundation. The White Paper, entitled "Completing the Internal Market", was
published following the Dooge Report, in June 1985.
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sors provide a useful example of a limited form of economic policy
co-ordination, and are treated briefly in Section 4. Finally, since
Professor Lee has accused economists of lacking a sense of history
to temper their preoccupation with the short term (Lee, 1984),
I conclude with a brief historical comment on the last time Ireland
participated in an economic and political union.
2. A Homogenous Internal Economic Area
The Dooge Report sets as a priority the creation of an
homogenous internal economic area by bringing about the fully
integrated internal market envisaged in the Treaty of Rome.
This is seen as an essential (inevitable?) step towards the objective
of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) first described in 1970
by the Werner Committee. The dynamic effects of a large single
market are claimed to include "more jobs, more prosperity and
faster growth". The means to be used are grouped into four
broad categories:
(i) completion of the Treaty;
(ii) creation of a technological community;
(iii) strengthening of the EMS;
(iv) mobilisation of the necessary resources.
Item (ii) seems, within the Committee, to have been relatively
uncontroversial and dealt with such matters as European
technical standards, public contracts, education and training,
etc. Only Greece felt obliged to enter some reservations. Item
(iv) appears to show the signs of much internal wrangling which
never reached the printed page of the Report. Only the Danish
representative was so forthright as to express the view that the
budget might be too small! Items (i) and (iii) contain the main
policy recommendations of the Dooge committee and are
obviously interrelated. Under item (i) three types of "policy"
are distinguished:
(a) free movement of labour and capital within the market with
co-ordinated economic policies, simplified customs proce-
dures, acceptance of national standards, the strengthening
of the EMS, and a broad range of commercial policies;
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(b) increased competitiveness by removal of all measures
distorting competition, particularly in nationalised
industries;
(c) promotion of economic convergence ("promotion of
solidarity amongst the Member States aimed at reducing
structural imbalances" and "positive action to counter the
tendencies to inequality").
Item (i)(c) appears to have been subject to many differing views.
For example, the Greek representative wanted more explicit
policies. The German and Dutch representatives wished to define
"convergence" as "convergence of economic policies". One
must assume that they disagreed with a definition of convergence
based on living standards, inflation differentials, etc. The
Belgians had a similar reservation. The brief text of (i)(c) was
penned with sparsenes and subtlety.
Finally, item (iii) expresses satisfaction with the performance
of the EMS and advocates movement towards monetary
integration by the appropriate economic and monetary policies.
3. Convergence, Co-ordination, Harmonisation and Interdependence3
In an ideal world one could proceed to examine the
consequences of the Dooge economic policy and
recommendations of the European Council White Paper, with
formal interlinked models of the economies of the EEC Members
States. In fact, such formal analysis would have preceded Dooge’s
and the Commission’s work and would have been a major input
into it. Unfortunately, no fully satisfactory interlinked models
exist, where by satisfactory, one means models which would
command a broad assent among economists. In addition, the
technical details and problems of such exercises are
formidable.4
What one can attempt to do is to clarify the meaning of some
3. This section draws from Steinherr, (1984) Cooper, (1985) and Swann, (1984).
4. Helliwell and Padmore, (1985) is a very recent review of the performance and
use of linked macroeconometric models of two or more countries. Models which include
some, or all, of the EEC countries include Project LINK, Eurolink, Interlink and the
European Commission’s own model COMET. Helliwell and Padmore conclude that
what is needed are clearer explanations of the comparative properties of the component
national models as well as a clearer analytical and empirical decomposition of the strength
and nature of the links between countries.
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basic terms frequently used: convergence, co-ordination, har-
monisation and interdependence; develop in general terms the
arguments in favour of policy co-ordination in a community of
interdependent economies, and explain limits and difficulties
of co-ordination. First, convergence refers to the attainment of
objectives of economic policy while co-ordination refers to the choice
of mutually consistent target values and the derived selection,
magnitude and timing of the instruments of economic policy.
In a multi-country economy such as the EEC, convergence is usually
taken to mean a reduction in the differences between national
targets (e.g., per capital income, inflation differentials,
unemployment rates, etc.), with the eventual achievement of the
most desirable, feasible, target values. Convergence of itself is
not desirable. It contains an efficiency objective (a higher level
of welfare) and a distributive objective (to close the gap between
richer and poorer areas of the EEC). Harmonisation is reserved
for the setting of rules with the aim of reducing the scope for
discretionary decisions and achieving a greater uniformity in
economic structure (e.g., tax harmonisation).
Hence, co-ordination is a political process of rendering
discretionary national policies more consistent5 and more likely
to achieve policy targets. Co-ordination is "soft" when limited
to general or qualitative guidelines. Where co-ordination is
understood in the stricter sense of the quantitative commitments,
the political and administrative constraints are greater. Macro-
economic policies for open economies differ in important ways
from the corresponding policies for closed economies.6 The
openness factor imposes constraints on the effectiveness and
conduct of policies and creates interdependence through many
channels. International trade links prices in different national
economies, a link that is not rigid but one which effectively
prevents a country from changing its long-run inflation rate
independently of the long-run courses of monetary policy and
5. Steinherr, (1984) illustrates the policy co-ordination problem with both the classical
Tinbergen-Meade targets-instruments approache and the game-theoretic approach where
the economy can be imagined as representing a dynamic game with several players:
the "public", the "monetary authority", and "fiscal authority" and "the European
Commission".
6. "The modern open economy is not the one found in most macroeconomic textbooks,
an economy that occasionally imports Bordeaux wine, but which produces most of what
it consumes at prices determined domestically" (Marston, 1985).
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the exchange rate. Changes in aggregate demand in any
particular country are transmitted internationally under both
fixed and floating exchange rates, constraining the effectiveness
of the domestic multipliers. Secondly, international mobility of
capital links interest rates on financial assets and limits the power
of monetary policy. In the EEC, where barriers to trade and
capital flows are less important and where exchange rates are
pegged, transmission of changes in competitiveness or in demand
conditions is very strong and the need for co-ordination is
therefore very great.
Being a small and open economy (SOE) can be an advantage
in certain circumstances in that one can more easily enjoy the
benefits of a "free ride". However, it is also a disadvantage in
that its feedback effects on larger economies can be ignored, and
thus large economies can be indifferent to the plight of small
economies, while at the same time severely restricting the
effectiveness of the SOE’s policy actions. Economic policy co-
ordination in the EEC must aim at making the choices of the
larger more powerful economies acceptable to the smaller
economies on the understanding that the smaller economies
support the common policies and abstain from "free rides".
Hence, a group of interdependent economies of varying sizes
and degrees of openness can choose to operate among four
alternatives:
(i) no policy c0-ordination; . ....
(ii) policy co-ordinatlon;
(iii) policy harmonisation;
(iv) institutional integration involving the transfer of much
discretionary decision making to a central, or Community
level.
The Dooge Report and the Commission White Paper operate
at various levels between (ii) and (iv) with, however, a strong
presumption that full economic union is an inescapable ultimate
destination. There may exist optimal levels for policy making,
some remaining at a national level with varying degrees of co-
ordination, others being transferred to the Community level
where co-ordination is important but difficult to achieve.
The reasons for lack of co-ordination lie in the different
14
perspectives and interests among nations, even in settings in
which all recognise the potential gain from co-ordination.7 For
example, countries may not agree on policy objectives and may
differ on such matters as the balance between fighting inflation
and lowering unemployment. Even if their objectives are the
same, they may differ in their forecasts, expectations and
economic theories, and hence on the relationship between ends
and means of policy. They may simply mistrust each other.
Finally, public sentiment for preserving national freedom of
action still runs sufficiently strong in most countries to make
economic policy co-ordination politically difficult. There is often
a fundamental confusion between national autonomy and national
sovereignty. Sovereignty is the ability of a nation to act on its own
rather than under the coercion of other nations. For example,
Ireland could leave the EEC but would, perhaps, have to suffer
some unpleasant consequences if she did so. National autonomy,
on the other hand, is the ability of a nation to attain its objectives
through unilateral action. As we have discussed, this autonomy
is heavily constrained in an environment of high economic inter-
dependence. Far from undermining national sovereignty,
economic co-operation often represents wise exercise of that
sovereignty.
4. The European Monetary System
Professor Walsh has pointed to the irony that, for Ireland,
the most immediate consequence of the EMS, whose goal was
the creation of a wide "zone of monetary stability", was the
breakup of the oldest currency union between sovereign states
in Europe (Walsh, 1984, p. 173). Professor Lee regards the whole
issue of Irish entry to the EMS as illustrating "the promise and
the pitfalls of the economic imperative" (Lee, 1984). The debate
on entry, he says, was dominated by a series of superior technical
contribution from the economists. Unfortunately, their virtually
unanimous predictions regarding the consequences of entry failed
to materialise in the early years of membership.
Long before the Bremen Summit of 1978 where Chancellor
Schmidt’s initiative led to the setting up of the EMS, the more
ambitious goal of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) had
7. What follows is drawn from Cooper, (1985).
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been attempted, i.e., the ultimate state of economic integration
in which member countries become merely regions of the union.
Basically five ingredients serve to characterise such a union:
(i) free movement of goods and services and a common
external tariff- the customs union element;
(ii) free movement of all factors of production (together, (i) and
(ii) constitute a Common Market);
(iii) national currencies would have to be fully convertible or
would be replaced by a union currency;
(iv) co-ordination of national economic policies;
(v) inter-regional transfers.
In a world where all markets are competitive and all prices
perfectly flexible, agents rational and adjustment costs negligible,
there would be no need for co-ordination policies or transfers.
Each economy would adjust instantaneously to shocks. Policy
co-ordination may be regarded as due to market imperfections.
Inter-regional transfers can be interpreted as necessary to induce
losers to accept a free competitive solution.
Whilst the Treaty of Rome does not call for the creation of
an EMU, it does nevertheless contain, in Articles 103 to 109,
detailed rules regarding the conduct of macroeconomic policy.
In the debate on EMU, two opposing views emerged: those who
favoured early action on locking exchange rates on the
assumption that the necessary monetary discipline would,
therefore, be imposed upon Member States; and those who
favoured convergence of economic performance prior to setting
immutable parities. The compromise adopted was the system
of reduced margins of fluctuation around the central parities
known as the snake. The subsequent trials and tribulations of
the snake are well known: a period of major world economic
instability intervened and sufficient policy co-ordination never
became a reality. Chancellor Schmidt’s more modest EMS
proposal dropped the idea of immutable exchange rates and a
common currency and merely aimed at creating a zone of
monetary stability in Europe.
The particular problems facing Ireland in the EMS have been
well documented and relate mainly to the absence of the UK
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from the system and the failure to implement supportive domestic
economic policies.8 Of particular interest from our EMS
experience are the following:
(i) the very slow adjustment of trade flows to the new exchange
rate environment (although McAleese (1984) is less
dogmatic on this point than Walsh (1984));9
(ii) the prolonged high inflation rate differential between
Ireland and other EMS members, but where the close
trading relationship with the UK (another high inflation
country) removed the pressure to devalue as often as, say,
Italy;
(iii) the effort to make Irish incomes policy compatible with our
EMS commitment in, for example, the recommendations
in the National Planning Board’s Proposal for Plan that the
national maximum wage incease be a weighted index of
the pay increases expected in other EMS/EEC countries.
Certainly, it would appear from the Dooge proposal that all
Member States participate in the EMS, would attenuate a major
source of exchange rate uncertainty for Ireland.
Die ich rief die Geister werd ich
nun nicht los
Goethe
5. Remembering the Irish Future~°
An "Act of Union" must surely rank with "felon setting"
as a word which has very negative connotations for Irish people.
There is a popular view that Union has been tried before and
worked very badly. It is accepted by historians that the Irish
economy grew strongly during the 18h century but that growth
8. Walsh, (1984) provides an incisive survey of Ireland’s relationship with the EMS.
9. "If we can conclude little else with certainty about the experience of the past three
years (1978-1981), we can affirm that a commitment to fixed exchange rates between
groupings of countries is not sufficient to result in a restructuring of trade flows", (Walsh,
1984 p.181). However, "It is too early to say exactly how the effects of this change
in the pattern of competitiveness will alter the trends in trade flows observed in the 1970s",
(McAleese, 1984, p.169).
10. The enigmatic title comes from a television lecture given by Professor Seamus
Deane.
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turned into industrial decline during the 19th century (Cullen,
1969). Because this decline followed the Act of Union between
Great Britain and Ireland, it is often assumed that it was caused
by the Union. However, the correlation between the withdrawal
of protection in the first quarter of the 19th century and industrial
decline is poor. Daniel O’Connell’s agitation for the repeal of
the Union identified what was described as the "commercial
injustices" of the Union as the cause of economic difficulties.
There were, however, no injustices in the commercial clauses
of the Act of Union. Moreover, Irish tariffs before the Union
were already too low to effectively exclude English manufacturers.
The real determinants of Irish economic retardation prior to
1847, although political resentment obscured the issue, may have
been outside the legislative and fiscal sphere. Externally, these
determinants were the technological and organisational advances
of the Industrial Revolution in Great Britain and the radical
improvement in transport wrought by the railways; internally
it was the growth of population. Technological changes and
transport improvements at that time went hand in hand in
producing increased competition for small-scale and domestic
industry in Ireland and the undermining of industry made the
consequences of population growth all the more serious. While
there is no universally accepted explanation of how the Irish
economy reacted to the economic imperatives of the Union with
Great Britain, the 19th century, in addition to providing a rich
agenda of historical precedents for modern economic problems,
may still provide psychological influences on our attitude to
European Union,11 given that external circumstances today in
many ways resemble those facing Ireland in the 19th century.
11. In any public discussion of European Economic Union, one is inclined to overlook
the fact that we have recently had a detailed study of the macroeconomic consequences
and possible benefits of integrated economic policy, planning and co-ordination in Ireland
(New Ireland Forum, 1984). In this case there are, of course, very specific points that
dominate the analysis -- the savings from cessation of violence and the funding of the
external transfers to the North. Nevertheless, it would be interesting to extend further
the DKM work to take into account more complex North-South economic interactions
if for no other reason but to carry out a debate on economic and policitcal union on
grounds which are more directly familiar than the broader, more abstract issue of
European union.
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THE ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS
OF TAX HARMONISA TION
JOHN D. FITZGERALD
1. Introduction
Moves to bring about increased harmonisation of tax systems
within the EEC were already underway when Ireland joined the
Community in 1973. These efforts bore fruit in the introduction
of a common VAT system among all Member States (while still
permitting differences in actual VAT rates). In spite of this
success, attempts to harmonise the excise tax and corporation
tax systems of Member States have consistently failed over the
last fifteen years. However, the European Council in Milan in
December 1985 expressed the intention of achieving an internal
market free of border controls by the end of 1992. This decision
follows on the proposals contained in the Spinelli Report for the
European Parliament in 1984 and the Dooge Committee Report
published in 1985. These moves towards greater harmonisation
of tax systems do not originate from a belief in tax harmonisation
per se but rather from a desire to complete the internal community
market by abolishing all economic frontiers. It is believed that
such an abolition of border controls and restrictions will result
in considerable economic advantages to the Community,
advantages which would make any costs involved in the necessary
harmonisation of taxes worthwhile (see Albert and Ball, 1983).
If this objective of the abolition of economic frontiers by 1992
is to be achieved it will require considerable changes in the tax
systems of Member States over the intervening period, as well
as changes in other areas affecting freedom of movement of
goods, capital and persons. The programme necessary to achieve
this objective is set out in the Commission’s White Paper on
Completing the Internal Market (1985). Whether this objective will
be met is a political question not discussed here. However, it
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should be noted that in the area of tax harmonisation progress
will continue in the future to depend on unanimity among all
Member States. The Council decision itself and the momentum
which it imparts to the Commission will be a major influence
on proposals for changes in the tax system in Members of the
Community over the next five or seven years. In spite of the
potential economic significance for Ireland of these proposals little
consideration has been given to them in public debate.
This paper does not attempt to weigh up the overall benefits
to Ireland of the programme to complete the internal market.
Instead it concentrates on the economic implications of the
proposals on tax harmonisation contained in the Commission’s
White Paper. While absence of a fully articulated plan of the
desired final harmonised tax system and the paucity of economic
research in this field do not permit definitive conclusions to be
reached, it is still possible to provide an assessment of the overall
significance for Ireland of current proposals.
The structure of this paper is as follows: Section 2 examines
the implications for the Irish tax system of the proposals on tax
harmonisation. The economic implications for Ireland of the
necessary tax changes are discussed in Section 3 and Section 4
considers the implications for economic policy of the Commission
proposals. Conclusions are set out in Section 5.
2. Implications for the Irish Tax System of Proposals on Harmonisation
To date the approach to tax harmonisation within the context
of either the existing EEC, or within a more tightly knit European
Union, has been ad hoc in nature. Tax harmonisation has not
been seen as an end in itself but is generally seen as a necessary
baggage which must be carried on the way to achieving other
economic goals. While the absence of a theology of tax
harmonisation is to be welcomed the approach runs the danger
of ignoring some of the possible economic effects of any proposals.
This is due to a concentration on the bargaining process by which
any progress towards a harmonised tax system will eventually
be achieved. The Commission view appears to be that the
eventual harmonised tax system will be as much a Weighted
average of existing systems as a product of economic analysis.
While this may be a realistic appraisal of the decision-making
mechanism, the absence of a theoretical framework, such as that
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underlying the Irish Commission on Taxation reports, may result
in a generally unsatisfactory outcome.
The two most important areas which have long been identified
by the EEC Commission as necessitating further tax harmoni-
sation are indirect taxation and the taxation of companies. The
desire to ~complete the internal market" by abolishing all border
controls clearly has serious implications for the indirect tax
systems of all members. The desire to harmonise company
taxation stems from a belief that the existing diversity of tax
structures across Member States leads to distortions and results
in advantages being conferred on certain companies which some
would argue are in some way unfair.
Clearly the abolition of border controls, without tax harmoni-
sation, would result in very considerable trade distortions as
individuals evade taxes by buying those goods in neighbouring
countries which were subject to a lower tax rate. While certain
administrative measures, along the lines proposed by Sijbren
(1983) could limit the extent of this evasion to private individuals,
rather than to commercial transactions, the scope for distortion
of trade patterns would remain large. While it is clear that the
abolition of border controls would necessitate the adoption within
the European Union of a harmonised, if not an identical tax
system, the nature of the harmonised tax system remains to be
determined.
In considering the likely structure of a new harmonised indirect
tax system an important pointer will clearly be the nature and
diversity of the tax systems at present in force in other Member
States. Table 1 sets out a comparison of the revenues from
different forms of taxation, expressed as a percentage of GDP.
The most obvious area of diversity of practice among EEC
members in the field of indirect taxes concerns excise taxes. For
the EEC as a whole such taxes in 1982 amounted to 4.4 per cent
of GDP. In Ireland, on the other hand, they accounted for 10.0
per cent of GDP, the highest figure for any Member State. As
a result, while the precise characteristics of a possible new
harmonised European tax system would have to be negotiated
and are, therefore, unknown, it is highly likely that it would
involve a substantial reduction in excise taxes in Ireland. It
would, of course, probably also involve significant changes in
Italy and Spain, where excise taxes account for a very small
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percentage of GDP. Revenue from VAT, expressed as a
percentage of GDP, shows considerably less diversity across EEC
countries than is the case for excise taxes. Thus Ireland is close
to the average, where revenue is expressed as a percentage of
GDP. (Of course, this does not necessarily mean that the rates
of tax are close to the EEC average. Differences in the
composition of consumption across countries, in particular,
differences engendered by excise taxes, could affect these figures.)
Given that extensive work has already been undertaken to
harmonise the VAT system this result is not altogether surprising.
As a result, any attempt to harmonise VAT rates across countries
might involve relatively little change in the Irish VAT system.
The Commission White Paper reports that experience in the
US suggests that some difference in tax rates may still be
consistent with abolition of border controls. They recommend
that up to 5 per cent difference between neighbouring states
would be possible without causing major trade distortions. In
the light of this experience they recommend that a margin of
plus or minus .2 ~ per cent on either side of a target VAT rate
should be permitted. This would substantially reduce the
adjustment necessary in the case of the VAT system but would
do little to alter the magnitude of the changes required in excise
taxes.
Commission proposals also envisage significant action to
harmonise company taxation across the Members of the
Community as well as strict controls of national state aids to
industry. The Commission, in a draft directive, published as
long ago as 1975, called for a common tax system with rates
ranging from 45 to 55 per cent. Clearly such a proposal, if
implemented, would require substantial changes in the Irish tax
system.
Corporation tax in Ireland in 1982 accounted for a smaller
than average share of GDP. However, when viewed in the
context of total tax revenue, the difference is relatively small.
The most obvious difference between the Irish corporate tax
structure and those of other EEC countries lies in the rate of
tax on profits in manufacturing industry. In Ireland the rate of
tax is 10 per cent whereas rates in other Member Countries are
in the range of 35 per cent to 56 per cent (Bulletin of the European
Communities, 1980). Harm0nisation of tax rates would, therefore,
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Table 1 : Comparison of sources of tax revenue in certain EEC countries, revenue as a percentage of GDP
1982
Belgium Denmark France Germany Ireland Italy Spain UK EEC
Total Taxes on Goods and Services 12.11 16.19 12.97 9.88 18.18 6.57 5.59 11.47 12.00
of which: Taxes on specific goods and
services (excise) 3.60 5.69 3.39 3.34 9.98 1.76 2.45 5.51 4.36
General taxes on production
and sale (VAT) 7.77 9.84 9.25 6.11 7.66 5.61 3.14 5.30 7.17
t,z Total Social Insurance 13.89 1.24 18.87 13.48 5,95 18.84 11.77 8,44 11.88
of which: Employers’ Social Insurance    7.98 0.60 12.57 7.24 3.77 14.82 9.15 3.55 n.a.
Employees’ Social Insurance    4.73 0.65 5.00 6.0t 2.13 2.82 2.61 3.00 n.a.
Total Tax on Income, Profits, etc. 19.81 24.51 7.88 12.67 13.67 12.76 6.57 15.03 14.27
of which: Tax on Corporate Income 2.83 1.t4 2.22 1.91 1.87 3.19 1.18 3.79 2.71
Tax on Personal Income 16.92 23.38 5.62 10.77 11.80 9.71 5.28 11.24 11.53
Total Tax Revenue    1982 46.65 43.97 43.72 37.27 39.57 38.27 25.33 39.60 40.08
1983
Total Tax Revenue    1983 n.a. 44.12 44.07 37.19     40.55      n,a. 24.50 38.28 n.a.
Source: Revenue Statistics of OECD Member Countries, 1965-1983,
involve a major change in the Irish tax system.
As well as changes in tax rates, harmonisation of corporation
tax systems would also involve a reduction in the very generous
Irish provisions on the treatment of investments. While changes
in the German and the UK tax systems in the 1970s resulted
in an increase in such allowances, causing their tax systems to
move closer to our own (FitzGerald, 1983), the tendency in the
1980s, at least in the UK, has been in the opposite direction.
The third area which might necessitate increased harmonisat-
ion of the tax systems of members is the provision on the free
movement of capital. The introduction of free movement of
capital, with no changes in the manner in which the domestic
tax administration is integrated with administrations in other
countries, could lead to new distortions as people seek to evade
Irish tax by moving assets abroad. The growth of non-resident
Irish pound bank accounts suggests that such a tendency already
exists. Even the harmonisation of legislation on direct taxation
across countries would not necessarily prevent such distortions.
It is only through co-ordination of tax administrations that loop-
holes, which allow evasion of taxes through movement of funds
out of individual tax jurisdictions, can be closed. (One possible
method of reducing the problems in this area would be to
introduce a common witholding tax on dividends and interest
payments across all Member States.)
Apart from such administrative changes, neither the latest
proposals on European Union, nor earlier Commission
proposals, would necessitate any further harmonisation of taxes
on personal incomes or social security taxes. The fact that these
taxes can have at least as important a distortionary impact on
companies as capital taxes is totally ignored.
3. Economic Implications of Tax Changes
The potential economic effects of tax harmonisation can be
considered under a number of different headings. In the case
of excise duties the most obvious effect of any harmonisation
of tax rates at a level below existing Irish rates (probably
substantially below existing Irish rates) would be the loss of
revenue incurred. While the replacement of such a tax by
alternative taxes might be achieved leaving the level of real
personal disposable income unchanged, it would, none the less,
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pose a serious problem for any Irish government. The choice
between raising other taxes and cutting expenditure would
obviously depend on the manner in which the revenue gap was
closed.
Assuming that there was no change in real personal disposable
income, as the revenue loss is offset by other measures, a
reduction in excise taxes would substantially affect the relative
prices of different commodities. However, even the size of the
price change which would result from a reduction in excise taxes
would be uncertain. While there is some evidence on tax
incidence (Keegan, 1984) which suggests that the bulk of the
excise taxes are passed on to the consumer, the possible ’changes
in rates are so large that one would be entering uncharted
economic territory. It is quite likely that some of the benefits
of lower prices would be taken by producers, distributors and
importers. For example, there is some evidence that the net of
tax price of cars is lowest in countries with the highest tax rates
on cars. This would imply that some of the benefits of a reduction
in tax would accrue to foreign producers, some to importers and
some to distributors.
The fall in prices, even if it did not fully reflect the fall in taxes,
would result in a substantial shifting of consumers’ expenditure
to consumption of goods which are currently subject to substantial
excise taxes, away from the consumption of all other goods. While
the model described in Keegan (1984) could possibly provide
a basis for examining both questions of incidence and the possible
substitution effects of changes in relative prices, experience using
such models suggests that, even for marginal price changes, the
results may not be very reliable. In cases of very extensive
changes in relative prices they would be subject to very large
margins of error.
In addition to the effects on the allocation of domestic
consumers’ expenditure over domestic goods, any substantial
change in excise taxes could be expected to affect both tourism
exports and imports. If combined with a harmonisation of VAT
taxes across the EEC, in particular in Spain, the change would
significantly reduce the attractiveness of locations such as Spain
to Irish holidaymakers and increase the attractiveness of Ireland
to foreign tourists. However, such harmonisation would certainly
lead to the growth of non-EEC resorts such as Yugoslavia which
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would reduce the benefits expected to occur from the reduction
in the current, tax-induced, distortions in Irish import and export
tourism.
The effect of the changing consumption pattern on the demand
for domestic goods and services would need to be examined in
the context of an overall model of the Irish economy. The increase
in expenditure on cars and petrol, which would occur if excise
taxes were reduced, would largely benefit foreign producers of
cars and petrol. The diversion of expenditure away from goods
with a higher domestic output content would tend to reduce
domestic output. However, the results of increased domestic
consumption of alcohol would, on the basis of current evidence,
tend to benefit the domestic productive sector. Clearly the
tourism effects would be beneficial to domestic producers. The
overall balance could only be quantified by using a suitable
macroeconomic model.
;Fhe third report of the Commission on Taxation says that
the major argument in favour of excise taxes is one of economic
efficiency: they are a substitute for user charges or they attempt
to take account of externalities. To the extent that they do, at
present, perform this role, there will be a cost to the community
at large from their reduction. However, the evidence in this
regard is weak. Curtin (1978) showed that revenue from smokers
is probably substantially greater than the costs to society of their
habit. In the case of alcohol, Walsh’s study (1980) suggested that
the same was true for Ireland for 1976. However, the effects of
a big reduction in excise duties on alcohol could produce much
bigger changes in consumption patterns and, therefore, in social
costs than might be expected at the margin. As a result, the
evidence of previous research is not necessarily a good indicator
of the effects of major changes in the structure of excise taxes.
The second important area where European Union might
involve changes in the Irish tax system is company taxation. The
harmonisation of the tax system itself, in terms of definitions
of the tax base, nature of allowances and provisions for
imputation need not, of themselves, have major effects on the
Irish economy. However, any move to harmonise rates of tax
and allowances could, potentially, have very important economic
implications for Ireland. If, as the EEC Commission proposed
in 1975, rates of corporation tax were harmonised at the 45 to
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55 per cent level it would mean a radical change for firms in
the manufacturing sector. For those firms which set up in Ireland
primarily to obtain the benefit, through transfer pricing, of the
low tax rate on profits generated elsewhere, their raison d’etre
would disappear. For other firms or new firms considering setting
up in Ireland it would prove a significant discouragement. While
no quantitative evidence is available on the likely impact of such
a change in tax rates in Ireland, it seems possible that the loss
of domestic output would, in the short term, so erode the base
for this tax that revenue would fall. It could also erode the bases
for other taxes through its effects on employment. Given that
the evolution of the structure of the Irish manufacturing sector
over the last thirty years has been so intimately related to this
tax provision, any sudden change could cause serious disruption.
This does not mean that the policy of low tax rates on profits,
particularly the profits of foreign multinationals, is necessarily
in the long-term interest of Ireland. However, the question would
need serious further examination before the long-term effects
of harmonisation of tax rates on profits could be estimated.
As well as harmonisation of the rate of corporation tax, the
Commission also propose the harmonisation of capital and other
allowances which can be offset against taxable profits. This would
involve a reduction in the tax allowances granted to investors
in Ireland. Taken together with the harmonisation of corporation
tax rates it would make Ireland a much less attractive location
for investment, especially foreign investment.
However, some harmonisation of the company tax system is
not necessarily inimical to Ireland’s interests in using the cor-
poration tax system to attract foreign investment. The 1970s saw
a progressive and semi-competitive bidding up of capital
allowances by many countries such as the UK, Germany and
the US. If some order could be imposed which recognised the
need of less developed Member States to use the corporation
tax system to encourage domestic industrial development, it
would save all countries the expense of competition in attracting
a limited part of new investment.I However, the policy
statements of the EEC Commission in the area of company
1. To the extent that Ireland is in competition with non-members of the EEC this
would not hold true.
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taxation (BuUetin of the European Communities, Supplement 1/80)
strongly oppose such a development, arguing the need to treat
all enterprises equally for corporation tax purposes across all
Members of the EEC. (They do not, however, extend this
argument to cover the harmonisation of social insurance charges
or other similar taxes levied on employers.) The replacement
of these tax provisions by the alternative of capital grants or
subsidies could also be ruled out under a European Union.
Finally, the harmonisation of tax administration (as opposed
to tax systems) in the field of direct taxation could provebeneficial
to Ireland. If a common witholding tax were levied on all interest
and dividend payments in all EEC countries it could potentially
reduce the scope for tax evasion through existing loopholes such
as non-resident bank accounts.
4. hnplications for Irish Economic Policy
There are a number of implications for economic policy of
increased tax harmonisation consequent on movement towards
European Union. Perhaps the least important restriction placed
on domestic freedom of action would be the removal of indirect
taxes, especially excise taxes, as an instrument for implementing
mid-year adjustments to the stance of fiscal policy. As excise taxes
have traditionally borne this role in Ireland in the past, it would
necessitate the development of some other policy instrument
which could be varied at short notice.
More important than the loss of potential instruments for
regulating the economy in the very short term would be the loss
of indirect taxation as a potential policy instrument for demand
management. In particular, during the course of any adjustment
to a harmonised system of indirect taxation, the revenue
implications of the change would also serve to reduce the scope
for action on direct taxation and expenditure.
However, the scope for using indirect taxation, in particular
excise taxes, as an independent instrument is already severely
limited. The experience of the last few years highlights the fact
that already we cannot depart radically from the structure of
indirect taxation in Northern Ireland without serious loss of
revenue and distortion of trade. If the UK chooses to enter a
European Union involving harmonisation of excise taxes we will
be constrained to follow closely their new harmonised excise tax
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structure. It is only if the UK chooses not to participate that
we will have any real freedom of action in this area. If the UK
were to choose to continue their present excise tax policy, whereas
we harmonised our system of excise taxes with other Community
Members, all the costs of trade distortion would fall on the UK
and some of the costs of the adjustment in the Republic would
be offset by spillover of Northrn Ireland purchasing power into
the Republic.
The other area where Irish economic policy would be con-
strained by tax harmonisation would be the area of corporation
tax. For the past thirty years policy in this area has been aimed
at increasing domestic economic growth. The restriction on the
use of this instrument, without its replacement by some other
instrument suitable for influencing domestic supply and growth,
could prove serious.
However, even in the case of corporation tax, while we are
free to pursue an independent policy, this does not prevent other
countries such as the UK, the US and Germany taking evasive
or retaliatory action. As a result, the implications of tax
harmonisation within a European Union are not clearcut. It is
not a straight case of independence outside a European Union
and a complete loss of freedom within such a union.
5. Conclusions
(i) To a large extent the Commission proposals would fit in
with the proposals of the Irish Commission on Taxation
and in my view must, therefore, be considered to be
desirable. The road dictated by the proposals on tax
harmonisation is generally the road we would wish to travel
in the longer term. Exceptions are the proposals on
company taxation and excise taxes on alcohol.
(ii) The proposed harmonisation of taxes on companies could
pose serious problems for Ireland’s industrial development
in the future. Unless some other mechanism is substituted
by the Community to allow low income areas of the
Community, such as Ireland, to attract and hold industry,
these proposals could prove particularly serious, given the
importance of tax incentives in attracting industry to Ireland
over the past thirty years. While the Commission on
Taxation and other economists may question the validity
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of this industrial policy in the longer term, there is little
doubt that any rapid change in this area could prove
especially damaging.
(iii) The economic and social implications of a radical cut in
the tax on alcohol need to be considered further.
(iv) In the short to medium term the revenue implications of
these changes, in particular the excise tax changes, would
be serious. They could result in a re-ordering of priorities
so that precedence is given to implementation of reforms
in indirect taxes rather than direct taxes. However, in the
longer term this issue will probably be less serious and it
might be taken account of by some special arrangements
allowing adjustment of excise taxes in Ireland to be
completed over a slightly longer time scale than that
envisaged for other countries.
(v) Finally, it should be noted that if the UK decides to
harmonise its indirect tax system with that of the rest of
the Community we will, given our common land border,
have little choice but to follow them along the same road.
In summary, the long-term costs of a harmonisation of the
Irish indirect tax system with that of the rest of the Community
are likely to be relatively small and would probably be outweighed
by the potential benefits arising from the abolition of economic
frontiers which this harmonisation makes possible. The problems
in harmonising other forms of taxation may be more serious.
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SUBSIDIARITY, REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND
NATION BUILDING IN EUROPE
MICEAL ROSS
In the preamble to the Draft Treaty on European Union
submitted to the European Parliament and adopted by them on
14 February 1984 we read:
Determined to increase solidarity between the peoples of
Europe, while respecting their historical identity, their
dignity and their freedom whithin the framework of freely
accepted common institutions;
Convinced of the need to enable local and regional
authorities to participate by appropriate methods in the
unification of Europe; . . .
Intending to entrust common institutions, in accordance
with the principle of subsidiarity, only with those powers
required to complete successfully the tasks they may carry
out more satisfactorily than the States acting independently;
The High Contracting Parties, Member States of the
European Communities, have decided to create a European
Union.
This enshrining of the principle of subsidiarity is highly
significant. If Europe were organised according to this principle
there could be considerable advantages for regional development
and citizen participation, as well as a strategy for overcoming
the obstacles posed by the entrenched position of the
individualistic nation states, and a means by which the conflicting
economic philosophies of the market and of socialism could be
reconciled.
.
What, Then, is the Principle of Subsidiarity?
The principle is easy to enunciate but the practical application
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of its insights is more complex. Put succinctly this principle holds
that responsibilities must be discharged at the most decentralised
level in society consistent with their effective performance, and
that the individual or group so identified has a right not to have
this responsibility usurped by any more centralised level. Equally
where satisfactory performance calls for more than the abilities
and resources of a particular level that level should transfer the
responsibility and right to the first greater social aggregate which
can promise an adequate performance. This ceding, however,
carries with it both the right of the lower group to be consulted
and its duty to co-operate with the higher group. One of the
functions of higher groups is to ensure that in the discharge of
a duty a lower group acts in a manner consistent with the
common good and without infringing the rights of others.
In the concrete situation an individual is normally competent
to choose a career, a life style, a spouse, etc., subject to the rights
of others but must normally acknowledge the family as having
the competence of providing for the emotional and developmental
needs of children. The implications of the principle can be traced
up the social hierarchy. To a certain extent there are already
elements of such an ordering on a geographical basis as when
fire services are controlled by municipalities and road repairs
by county councilsl In the highly centralised nature of Irish
society many other functions have been assumed at levels higher
than they need to be, thereby weakening or preventing more
local participation and control.
Although the idea of empowering the lowest competent level
is straightforward any move towards such an ordering of society
could stimulate considerable controversy and find itself in conflict
with power groups. They are the bureaucrats for whom power
is centralised at the top of the pyramid; the professionals who
seek to disparage the competence of individuals and groups in
favour of their own real or claimed expertise, and those who
favour a social engineering approach to dealing with social
problems. A major opponent is likely to be those who control
the Nation State who have proved as unwilling to restore power
to subnational assemblies as to cede power, however important,
to beneficial supranational groupings. Decentralisation will, thus,
cause tensions but these cannot only be creative in a democracy,
they may be urgently needed to revitalise democracy itself in
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a climate of alienation. Tawney (1966) claims that it is vital to
reassert the priority of political over economic values in a society
in which industry becomes a form of public service.
The principle of subsidiarity may seem esoteric to those steeped
in the political culture of Ireland. Nevertheless it was formulated
by the great philosopher, Thomas Aquinas, and lies behind much
of the enlightened practices of countries, such as The Netherlands
and Sweden. It has inspired the writing of Schumacher and may
become ever more important as we move into a post-industrial
society less dominated by the division of labour. It has been
deemed so valuable as to be enshrined in the preamble of the
Draft Treaty of the European Community. Its implications for
Irish society cannot be developed here (see Ross, 1984). Instead
we shall consider it in relation to the Draft Treaty and the
ordering of powers between the Member States and a central
co-ordinating group, viewed as a process of European nation
building.
2. Weintraub’s Analytical Framework
One of the shortest yet most rewarding frameworks for the
study of nation building was published by Weintraub in 1970.
In his approach he adopted a core-periphery analysis which suits
our purposes admirably. First, it permits us to treat Europe-
building as a series of interactions between the Member States
and the central co-ordinating bodies. Second, it indicates that
historically nation building has been most successful when core-
periphery relationships were inspired by a version of the
subsidiarity principle. Third, it notes that the failure to put
interactions on a correct basis can negative otherwise laudable
attempts of a periphery to improve its position -- a truth that
must be painfully obvious to all students of the Irish economy
today.
To make a crude simplification of Weintraub’s vivid and
complex canvas we can classify cores by two criteria (a) whether
they were powerful and (b) committed to overall development
while peripheries can be classified on three bases; first, by their
ability to mobilise for their own development, second, by their
influence on the centre’s policymaking and resource allocation,
and by their ability to keep their elites committed locally, and
third, by their desire to participate in overall nation building.
37
Weintraub’s typology can be usefully applied to the EEC, both
as it has been historically and in the context of the proposed
Union. In making this application I shall endeavour to show
that each of these factors is itself composed of many dimensions.
3. The Wealth of the European Community
Before considering these factors it is instructive to look at the
wealth of the Member States with their combined population
of 320 million. Even without Iberia the statistics of the EEC are
impressive. The work force of 100 million matches that of the
US in size. In 1980 savings of $430,000 million exceeded those
of the US ($380,000m). Expenditure on R&D was equal to
American levels and double the $250m spent by Japan. 400,000m
ECU are spent on public procurements. The area engages in
39 per cent of the world trade. It holds one-third of the world’s
foreign exchange reserves and half its gold reserves. This is power
indeed but to a considerable extent its potential is not realised
in that it is held by 10 peripheries, now to become 12.
4. Characteristics of the EEC Core
In this study I shall refer to the periphery as the Member States
and the EEC core as Brussels. ~The two questions that Weintraub
would ask about Brussels are whether it is (1) powerful and (2)
committed to Europe-building in conjunction with the Member
States. The first concept of power he would refine and seek to
answer three subquestions, i.e., is it rich?; has it a mobilisation
system?; and can it inform itself adequately on the task of welding
together a common European endeavour?
First we need to identify an EEC core in the traditional sense.
In so far as we can discover one, it consists of an elected
parliament with severely limited powers and a non-elected
commission of civil servants. The present core of the Community
is dominated by the periphery, i.e., by the intergovernmental
system of the Council of Ministers. The essence of the Draft
Treaty (and of the Dooge Report) is to transform this into a
system of codecision between the European Parliament and
Council so that laws require the assent of both and no single
government or small group of governments can stand in its way.
If this essence is removed, therest of the Draft (or of the Report)
is not of much account. In this way it is hoped to grasp the nettle
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of nationalism at its root and to make progress towards powerful
institutions "entirely at the service of the common interest" as
Dooge puts it. Such institutions would then constitute the core,
even if one of them was the Council of Ministers.
4.(i) Is the EEC Centre Powerful?
(a) Is it rich? In other words, does it have autonomous resources
and/or can it call on other resources? Brussels has at its disposal
the common tariffs, the 1.4 per cent VAT and the resources of
the European Investment Bank. These resources are paltry in
relation to the resources available to the Member States.
However, the latter do not provide the correct yardstick but
rather what the resources should be if the principle of subsidiarity
was fully applied. As we shall see later there could be a case for
limiting strictly the revenues available to Brussels. However, it
appears likely that any evaluation would find current levels
substantially too low.
(b) Has it a mobilisation system? It has to the extent that it
has the resources listed above. It has not to the extent that the
common citizens of the Member States do not identify with it.
Hence the interest of the EEC in symbols, such as a common
passport and regional fund road signs. In his book Peasants into
Frenchmen Weber (1976) recounted the numerous languages of
France: French, Breton, Basque, Catalan, German, Flemish,
Italian, Occidental and how it was only in the trenches of the
First World War that a common identify of Frenchman was
hammered out. The EEC needs to create a similar solidarity
before it truly possesses a mobilisation structure. The potential
is there and 14 million unemployed should provide the challenge
if only the solution can be clearly presented to fire the
imagination, as war does. This will be easier to achieve if a
sufficient body of political, economic and social opinion identifies
clearly a common interest. The researches of Albert and Ball
(1983) and the Spinelli proposals are an attempt by the European
Parliament to strengthen the core and provide such leadership.
(c) Can it inform itself adequately? The third question on power
asks about the extent to which it can draw upon adequate and
realistic data for its policies. Currently much of the needed
information is monopolised by the Member States and only made
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available to the extent that they determine to be in their own
interests. How much then does Brussels know about the
effectiveness of its policy instruments? For example, the regional
fund has spent 8,000 million ECUs to date, of which 85 per cent
was devoted to reimbursing national governments. Was this a
genuine investment increasing the EEC’s overall potential or
was it merely a case by which each country increased its
consumption "with each convinced of its entitlement to a larger
share than all the others" (Albert and Ball, 1983, p. 18). Brendan
Walsh (1984 p.59) has made similar comments on the Social
Fund in relation to special employment to unemployed young
people.
The basic issue is, given the limited resources of the core, what
should it seek to do to overcome recession and underdevelop-
ment. This question is related to the second dimension of a core.
4.(ii) Is the EEC Centre Committed to the Development of Europe?
Weintraub refines the concept of commitment by asking a
variety of questions:
(a) What is the fundamental guiding image that the core poss-
esses of how development takes place and of its role in this
process? There are two polar ideologies held by economists on
how developmnt should occur -- the market strategy and the
socialist exPeriment. The bureaucratic approach often favours
social engineering without necessarily subscribing to socialism.
Sociology and political science have other candidates. The
principle of subsidiarity would suggest other options.
In its economic inspiration the Treaty of Rome has
traditionally tended to favour the market orientation. The very
name Common Market indicates its focus on the free movement
of goods, services, capital and people. To prevent "distortions"
the Treaties give the Commission "exclusive competence" in
regulating the internal market, competition policy and
international commercial policy. Heeldragging on these
dimensions has caused the Draft Treaty to set explicit deadlines          !
for achieving the mobility objectives. The uneven conequences
of a liberal market regime are mitigated by the Common
Agricultural Policy and the structural policies. Here again a
market philosophy dictates what are to be acceptablestrategies.
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Regional policy has been dominated by the idea that differential
infrastructural investments will produce convergence while the
social fund emphasises retraining as its contribution to the
solution of inequalities. Only recently have these solutions been
questioned and a new dimension introduced by reserving some
of the resources of the Regional Fund for integrated regional
developments. To a large extent the emphasis on liberal trading
within the EEC was dictated by the needs of producing a genuine
and powerful internal market. The change in the regional furM
orientation may augur a rethink of the appropriate contribution
of the structural funds towards economic convergence.
What is clearly needed is a mechanism by which the EEC cake
is enlarged and at the same time an effective method to be devised
by which both lagging regions and areas harmed by the
consequence of overall growth can be helped to share in the rising
prosperity. Such as a mechanism is provided in embryo by the
Draft Treaty in its reference to subsidiarity. It is up to
policymakers and their advisers to demonstrate the best form
that this should take. Once this is done the executive role of the
Commission will need to be strengthened.
One of the problems facing Brussels in its efforts to "complete
the internal market" has been the extensive use of non-tariff
barriers to trade by countries seeking to compensate for the
disappearance of tariffs and quotas. The attempt to combat these
devices has led Brussels to define standards for Euro beer, etc.,
which have had the unfortunate byproduct of enabling opponents
to present Brussels as a mindless and faceless bureaucracy and
thereby weaken its powers of mobilisation. The new proposals
on European standards may overcome this drawback. Equally
a clear use of the principle of subsidiarity would be helpful.
(b) To what extent is the core well disposed to Irish develop-
ment? This is one of numerous supplementary questions about
commitment. I have attempted to answer these questions in a
paper I wrote several years ago (Ross, 1979). At that time I found
an enormous store of goodwill which expressed itself in many
practical ways. For example, during the time of the British
employment subsidy Irish firms were permitted to receive
subsidies while the Commission fought the abuse. On another
occasion the EEC used its limited resources to encourage the
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rationalisation of firms in the clothing and footwear industries.
The Western Package is yet another example. Support for Irish
development would be all the greater if it could be shown that
outlays were well spent.
On the other hand, the CAP is the only instrument that
disimburses funds without a local contribution. In some cases
the amount of the EEC contribution is small. In others the criteria
are based on national averages rather than Community averages
and so discriminate against disadvantaged areas. In industrial
policy higher percentages are permitted in disadvantaged areas
but, as no absolute levels of industrial grants are set, richer areas
can often outbid. Schemes for the elimination of inequalities
should not favour higher take-up rates among the wealthier areas.
The Commission itself is aware of these defects and the new
regional policy makes major improvements in funding
development. Significantly enough a number of commentators,
who were not Irish, have also proposed that regional funds be
used exclusively in Ireland, the Mezzogiorno and Greece.
Weintraub also asks if the core’s commitment to the periphery
can be classified as (a)preserving the status quo; (b) maintenance
of the existing order with some developments permitted on given
terms; (c) adaptive to change or (d) actually innovative and
creative. In this regard the concern of the Commission with
science and technology and its efforts to promote co-operation
among the Member States must deem it to be innovative.
In summary then the core of the EEC would appear to be
weak but committed to Europe’s development.
5. The Characteristics of the Periphery
Weintraub suggested three dimensions for the periphery:
(i) its ability to mobilise for its own development;
(ii) its influence with the centre and its ability to retain the
loyalty of its 61ites;
(iii) its desire to participate in the give and take of nation
building.
5.(i) To what extent is the periphery capable of mobilising
its resources for its own development?
This crucial question is Weintraub’s first about the periphery
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and one of the keys to the entire Draft Treaty. The key lies in
the principle of subsidiarity. It is a curious fact that, despite
Ireland’s well known name as a Catholic country, the social
encyclicals, such as Quadragesimo Anno, which drew their
inspiration from the principle of subsidiarity have largely been
ignored. Instead, and perhaps due to its colonial past, Ireland
has preferred the centralising gospel propounded by Sydney and
Beatrice Webb. The more human socialism of Cole and Tawney
suffered the fate of the encyclicals whose vision they shared. Like
the American and French declarations of independence the
Webbs’ views stressed rights rather than responsibilities. The
results are a centralising bureaucracy and an expensive delivery
of social goods in which voluntary effort is depreciated as well
as a frame of mind which exaggerates the value of the nation
State and its ability ’~to do something". This exaggeration of
the State’s powers has emasculated local initiative and bred a
dependent society willing to leave its destiny to social engineering.
The Spinelli document (EEC, 1984) provides a double
challenge to this outlook. It demands that competences be
returned to local bodies ~convinced of the need to enable local
and regional authorities to participate by appropriate methods
in the unification of Europe". It would be interesting to see which
rouses the hostility of national centralisers more -- the idea of
giving back powers taken from those lower down or surrendering
powers to those higher up.
Equally if a social level is not adequate to discharge a duty
it is bound to seek the help of a higher level. ~The smaller a
country is the greater the external constraint. Overall, the
Community’s rate of external dependence is of the same order
as that of Japan and the United States (10-15 % of GNP), while
the rate of individual countries such as Germany or France is
25-30%" (Albert and Ball, 1983, p.40). Presumably the external
constraint of Ireland is higher. Clearly even the EEC level will
be inadequate for some problems. However, a united EEC, with
an external dependence of 10 to 15 per cent would be a power
in the world arena and able to influence variables towards levels
which would be more in tune with its developmental needs. What
value would different and lower interest rates have been for
European industries, Irish exports and our national debt?
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5.(ii) Is the periphery influential with the centre?
The nation states that make up the EEC vary enormously in
their economic, social, political and symbolic power. In seeking
to influence debate there are hidden problems. For example, in
a recent talk Weizs/icher illustrated succinctly how national
perceptions can differ and affect the ability to achieve consensus.
Germans concerned with acid rain on their forests sought to have
cars fitted with emission controls and were surprised when British
and French people interpreted this as an attempt to boost car
sales. The Germans proposed to educate the British and French.
When the latter retorted that a speed limit in Germany would
reduce emissions by 20 per cent the Germans became angry as
they were not prepared to give up speedy driving. Frequently
Irish stances on underdeve!opment or neutrality can be perceived
differently by others and often from a sympathetic viewpoint.
Effective communication needs to identify such perceptions as
they can have important implications for policy applications.
5.(iii) Does the periphery (nation state) wish to participate
in overall European Development?
Weintraub paraphrased this :question asking whether the
nation state was primarily concerned with its own interests and
needs, or was prepared to share in overall responsibility and give-
and-take. This characteristic can be considered along two lines:
(i) What is Ireland’s fundamental guiding image of its role
in Europe building?
Does it consider itself (a) subject to or (b) above the rules
of the game and/or Community guidance and overall
goals?
Does Ireland accept active responsibility towards, or is
it committed to action for the welfare of all Europe? Does
it conceive its responsibility as (a) passive -- minimal;
(b) tutorial m advisory; (c) regulatory-corrective-
redressive or (d) activatory-missionary?
(ii) What price is it willing to pay for participation and what
rewards does it expect? Is its orientation (a) self-centred;
(b) "philanthropic" or’(c) directed towards overall give-
and-take?
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(i) Its willingness to participate: Sometimes a nation will refuse
to pass up problems which it cannot handle itself to a higher
level, pleading a vital national interest. If the matter is a genuine
national interest as Gaston Thorn (1984) put it, it should be
"clearly defined and recognised as such, [ so that it] will become
the focus of active Community solidarity to assist the country
in difficulty. It will no longer serve as an excuse for unbridled
exercise of the right of veto" p. 19.
However, the contemporary concept of the national interest
in fact equates it with the current objectives of the member
government concerned. "So long as the governments are able
not only to formulate objectives that are in the people’s interest
but also to carry them out this may be seen, to paraphrase
Churchill, as the least bad political system available" (Pinder,
1984). Such autarky applies to fewer and fewer matters and
interdependence to more and more. Where objectives can be
made operational only if they were formulated and implemented
together with other countries, a government’s pursuit of
"national interest" becomes its attempt to secure as large as
possible an element of its own objectives and policies in the
common objectives of the countries concerned. In such a wrangle
it became hard to identify the common interest of the Community
as a whole and so by concentrating on the promotion of several
national interests the vast economic challenges that demand a
common response failed to find a solution. As Pinder (1984)
remarked: " ’National interests’ have produced incompetence
and irrelevance which would be intolerable in an institution with
minor responsibilities. Where the crisis is extremely grave they
have acted directly counter to the people’s interests".
The emotive term "national" is invoked to maintain the
maximum power of national government systems, in effect the
vested interests who will not change their political ideas. This
seeking of a monopoly is all the more foolish when the nation
state has not got the resources to go it alone and there is evidence
that Europeans in general would support proposals for a change,
such as those proposed in the Draft Treaty. Eurobarometer in
December 1984 asked Europeans if they were for or against
efforts being made to unify Western Europe. In general 77 per
cent were in favour, 10 per cent against and 13 per cent didn’t
know. In the original six the ratio was 82:8:10. Ireland scored
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60:13:27. Its level of support was the lowest, apart from Denmark
and its level of "don’t knows" was the highest -- double the
average. However, opposition was also lower than inBritain or
Greece. The Irish outcome reflects the low level of debate on
the issue in Ireland.
6. States’ Rights for the Member States
Governments need to be persuaded that a curtailment of some
of their existing functions offers them more meaningful functions
for the future. The Draft Treaty recognises that the various
strands of economic and social policy which may be the
responsibility of either the Union or the member governments
or both are so interdependent that a close co-ordination between
the different levels of government is required. In the Draft the
member governments operate both nationally and through the
Council of Ministers.
What is decided at the core level is spelt out: "Intending to
entrust common institutions, in accordance with the principle
of subsidiarity, only those powers required to complete
successfully the tasks they may carry out more satisfactorily than
the States acting independently" -- "in particular those whose
execution requires action by the Union because their dimension
or effects extend beyond national frontiers". This criterion is
a two fold one. It means that the States agree to joint decision-
making by majority rule and in association with the Parliament
in those .areas Where their individual actions are unlikely to be
very productive otherwise. It also means that the Union should
not usurp powers which the States can discharge more:effectively.
At this point many commentators have their own shopping lists.
For example, Donges (1984) would limit it to common policies
where technical externalities exist or to assure the functioning
of a common market.
Experience with the US Federal system indicates that states’
rights need to be explicitly safeguarded if creeping centralisation
is to be avoided.1 Weintraub’s model favoured a situation of
strong cores interacting with strong peripheries: National
governments must retain the stuff of healthy political life.
Safeguards could be built in in a variety of ways:
1. Much of this analysis is indebted to Pinder (1984).
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(a) Union competence could be defined more precisely.
(b) Competences reserved to states could be defined.
(c) Subsidiarity criteria could be defined so that the
effectiveness of central action could be weighed against
the values of diversity and political vitality.
(d) The instruments of the Union could be defined as
limited to a budget not exceeding 5 per cent of GDP,
taxes to finance it, a European currency and reserve
fund and laws to secure an open internal market;
and (e) the role of the Council in agreeing to legislation might
be increased.
The fundamental aim of the Draft Treaty is to persuade
enough Member States to accept an effective system of making
Union law and policy on central economic issues such as money,
interest rates, exchange rates, large-scale research and
development and industrial adjustment, external trade and the
internal market where common action is vital for recovery.
Hopefully the guarantees of state rights will help win over
resistance from British, French and other bureaucracies and help
to lay to rest the ghost of nationalism that has so tragically
haunted Europe in this century. It will be noted that in many
of these areas, e.g., money, interest rates, exchange rates,
Ireland’s exercise of autonomy for decades consisted of
maintaining parity with another sovereign state. A clear
identification of states’ and regional rights according to the
principle of subsidiarity function should help overcome some of
the fears inhibiting more wholehearted participation.
7. The assessment of costs and benefits
A periphery’s willingness to share in European give-and-take
will depend on the price it is willing to pay and on the rewards
it expects in return.
In Ireland perceptions are often limited to the actual flows
of funds transferred from Brussels. The £700 million which
accrued in 1985, as I said in an earlier (1979) paper, has tended
to hyponotise many into overlooking other real benefits that do
not involve transfers. The income loss of a marginal change in
the milk price is exaggerated in debate and never set in the
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context of the vastly higher opportunities and potential in
concerted European action.
What really matters is that Ireland now belongs to a wider
European market with all its interdependencies. The debate over
the juste retour from the Brussels budget is a debate about
distribution when the real issue is how to achieve greater European
growth. In the context of such growth the benefits that would
accrue to Ireland far exceed the amounts which are involved in
a squabble over budget distributions. This truth has been
demonstrated in several studies.2
8. Summary
In summary then the drive for progress in Europe has been
slowed down by the nature of interaction between the European
core and its periphery. In Weintraub’s terms the Member States
can be regarded as mobilised, influential but not participant.
The core’s weakness does not permit it to demonstrate its
commitment to European nation building. The Spinelli draft
recognises the fears that many people and politicians have of
national identities and initiatives being swamped and proposes
a principle of subsidiarity as a safeguard against remote,
impersonal decision-making. This paper suggests that the powers
that would be shared between the nations and the core are ones
which the nations recognise that they cannot exercise effectively
on their own. It is the author’s belief that such a sharing would
improve considerably the interlocking future facing not only
Europe but the international economy as a whole.
2. See for example Albert and Ball (1983) or Gonzales (1984).
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